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JURISDICTION
Appelee does not object to the jurisdiction of the court and
accepts Appellants jurisdictional paragraph.
STATEMENT OF. ISSUES ON APPEAL
Throughout

this brief Plaintiff/Appellee,

Finance, will be henceforth referred to as "Ford."

Ford

Consumer

The Defendant/

Appellants will jointly be referred to as "Salazar."
Ford disagrees with Salazar's statement of issues on appeal.
Ford believes that Salazar's statement of issues on appeal are
improperly argumentative.

Therefore, Ford suggests alternatively

as follows:
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I.

Was the lower court correct in its ruling and order that

Ford's action against Salazar was based upon U.C.A. Section 78-3611 and, therefore, subject to a ten day period to appeal?
II.

Can Salazar raise on appeal a matter not dealt with

below; i.e., the tolling of the ten day appeal period while one of
the Salazars had filed a Chapter 13 petition before the United
States Bankruptcy Court?
III.

If Salazar had ten days to file an appeal, by what date

should the appeal have been filed?
STATEMENT 0£ TH£ CASE
Ford, being dissatisfied with the statement of the case in
Salazar's brief, suggests alternatively as follows:
A. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
In late June of 1990, Ford filed an action against Salazar to
evict Salazar from a home owned by Ford.

Ford previously had

served Salazar with a notice to quit premises pursuant to U.C.A.
78-36-6. (A copy of the complaint along with a copy of the notice
are attached to Salazar's brief.)
On July 10, 1990, an answer (without counterclaim) was filed
by attorney Sine.
brief.)

(A copy of the answer is attached to Salazar's

At no time before trial did Salazar object by motion to

the jurisdiction of the court, nor did Salazar attempt to have the
matter transferred to the district court.

-iv-

After discovery, on September 6, 1990f a trial was held before
the Honorable Michael K. Burton, circuit court judge.
favor of Ford.

He ruled in

Some of the pertinent Findings of Fact (which are

included in Salazar's brief) were as follows:
1.

Title to the premises was in Ford's name.

2.

Salazar's claim to the premises was verbal only.

3.

Ford satisfied the requirements of unlawful detainer.

4.

Salazar's claims of fraud were not proven.
(This
issue was considered, because of a pre-trial
stipulation of Fords's attorney).

5.

Reasonable rental value was established.

6.

Ford was entitled to a judgment of restitution of the
premises.

B. Facts relevant to the issues of the case
Salazar's only ownership claim to the premises in question was
based upon a verbal contract with Howard Sherwood, who owned the
premises prior to Ford. (This fact is not included

in the

transcript, but was testified to at the September 6, 1990, trial.)
Ford's ownership was based upon a non-judicial

foreclosure

sale after the default of payments due Ford by Sherwood on a
written contract, which was secured by a real estate deed of trust.
Salazar was making the payments for Sherwood to Ford but was
in default.

Neither Sherwood nor Salazar brought the contract with

Ford current after Ford filed its notice of default. (See paragraph
9 of the Findings attached to Salazar's brief.)
After Ford became the record owner, a notice to quit premises
was appropriately served.

(See paragraph 4 of the Findings.)
-v-

The complaint stated that Salazars were tenants at will, that
Salazar was properly notified to vacate, that Salazar retained
possession and asked the court for an order restoring possession of
the premises to Ford. (See complaint attached to Salazar's brief.)
A trial was held on September
prevailed.

6, 1990, in which Ford

Judgment was signed September 10, 1990, and notice of

the entry of judgment was mailed to Salazar's attorney September
13, 1990.
Subsequent to September 6, 1990, the parties did verbally
agree that Salazar would vacate the premises by midnight, Sunday,
the 23rd of September, 1991, in return for which Ford delayed
execution of its writ of restitution, (see lines 15 through 22 of
page 16 of the transcript.)
Rather than vacate, Mr. Salazar filed a pro se Chapter 13
petition. (See page ix of Salazar's brief and lines 23-25 of page
16 and lines 1-16 of page 17 of the transcript.)
Ford's attorney, who became aware of said Chapter 13 on
September 24, 1991, prepared appropriate pleadings, met with the
bankruptcy judge, and was sucessful in obtaining an ex. Parte order
granting relief from stay on September

25, 1991. (See order

attached to Salazar's brief and lines 6-12 of page 17 of the
transcript.)
Said Chapter 13 was subsequently

dismissed

according

to

bankruptcy court standing order #19. (See attached copy of
dismissal in Salazar's brief.)

Rule #19 is based upon the non-

appearance of debtor at the intitial section 341 meeting and/or the
failure to file the initial statement of affairs and schedules.
-vi-

Salazar's answer does not object to the jurisdiction of the
circuit court. (See Salazar's answer attached to the Salazar
brief. )
Salazar never otherwise formally objected to the jurisdiction
of the circuit court nor sought a transfer to the district court.
Salazar's attorney first brought the matter up at trial.

Ford's

counsel stated that the matter was for unlawful detainer only but
stipulated that the court could consider equitable issues in
deciding whether or not Salazars were in unlawful detainer.
The circuit court's judgment was appealed on September 26,
1991.

With the appeal Salazar

filed

a document

entitled

"superseadas bond."
On September 27, 1991, Ford filed a motion to strike appeal
and exception to bond, which said motion was scheduled for October
1, 1990.
By order dated October 1, 1990, Salazar's appeal was stricken,
because the lower court ruled that it was not timely.

The

objection to bond motion was, therefore, not heard.
The pending matter is an appeal from the October 1, 1990,
order only.

-vii-

Summary of the Argument
Point I.

Salazar

has claimed

that

the

lower

proceedings were not based solely upon unlawful detainer.

court
The

complaint, trial, findings/conclusions and all other proceedings
clearly indicate otherwise.
Point II.

Salazar at the final hearing at the circuit court,

which was considering Ford's motion to strike the appeal, failed to
even argue that the Chapter 13 filed by Salazar after judgment
tolled the running of the appeal time until Ford obtained relief
from the automatic stay.

Salazar has, therefore, waived that

claim.
Point III.

Salazar failed to appeal within 10 days.

Thererefore, the appeal was appropriately dismissed by the lower
court.

-viii-

Argument
POINT I,

FORD'S ACTION AGAINST SALAZAR WAS CLEARLY

ONE BASED

ON UNLAWFUL DETAINER AS DEFINED IN U.C.A. SECTION 78-36-3,
Salazar's first claim is that Ford's complaint was not just an
action based upon unlawful detainer but was a "hybrid or equity
action."

The facts clearly do not support this claim.

Please

refer to the copy of Ford's complaint attached to Salazar's brief.
Paragraph one of Ford's complaint is merely jurisdictional.
Paragraph two deals with the possibility that unknown parties
may have resided in the premises in question.
Paragraph three through five establish ownership in Ford.
Without ownership Ford would not be legally entitled to initiate an
unlawful detainer action.
Paragraph six sets forth Salazar's tenancy in the premises.
Salazars were tenants at will.
Paragraph seven deals with the statutory notice required by
U.C.A. Section 78-36-3 (1) (b) (ii), which requires no less than
five days notice to vacate under a tenancy at will.
gave ten days.

Ford's notice

U.C.A. Section 78-36-3 is attached hereto as a

copy.
Paragraph eight states that Salazars retained possession, even
though the notice was served.

U.C.A. Section 78-36-3 states that a

tenant is guilty of unlawful detainer if he continues possession as
a tenant at will after appropriate notice.

It is true that the

complaint uses the words "unlawful detention" rather than "unlawful
detainer."

However, Ford feels and hereby claims that the intent
-1-

was very clear, that Salazar was holding over after an appropriate
notice, and that no further time should be spent in arguing over
"detention" rather than "detainer."
Paragraph nine sets forth Ford's claim relative to daily
rental value, which is a necessary element of damages in unlawful
detainer.
Paragraph ten through twelve retain Ford's right to additional
damages in the event a pending sale was lost by Salazar's refusal
to vacate.

No new cause of action was stated.

Ford was merely

trying to maintain its right to consequential damages.
U.C.A. Section 78-36-10 (a copy of which is attached) states
that a judgment in favor of a Plaintiff in an unlawful detainer
action "shall include an order for the restitution of the
premises."

Accordingly, the prayer of Ford's complaint seeks an

order for restitution, as well as a money judgment.
its brief, once again pounces upon a word.

Salazar, in

Salazar argues that

"restitution" deals with something other than an unlawful detainer
action.

The statute is clear in refuting Salazar's argument.

Therefore, the complaint is crystal clear in what it seeks; i.e.,
restitution of premises to an owner from a tenant, treble damages,
plus possible consequential damages.
Salazar could have brought certain issues before the circuit
court either by filing a pre-answer motion objecting to the circuit
court's jurisdiction, by way of a counterclaim, or by way of a pretrial motion.

None of these options was taken by Salazar.

Salazar cannot now, on appeal, raise issues waived below.
-2-

The complaint was based in unlawful detainer.

Therefore, the

ten-day appeal period applies.
Fashions Four v. Fashion Place Associates, 681 P.2d 830 (Utah
1984), is the case primarily relied upon in Salazar's brief to
support his claim that Ford's action was for more than unlawful
detainer.

In that case the tenant/plaintiff's complaint contained

four causes of action, including forcible entry and for breaching
the lease.

The landlord/defendant filed a counterclaim which also

contained four causes, including one for declaratory relief.

The

equitable causes took that case out of the ten day to appeal rule.
Other than a reservation of rights to seek other damages,
Ford's claim against Salazar was completely based upon unlawful
detainer.

No issue was raised by either party at trial seeking

other than unlawful detainer damages and/or relief.
POINT II.

SALAZAR WAIVED CLAIMS OF TOLLING BY FAILING TO BRING THE

MATTER BEFORE THE LOWER COURT.
Salazar, on appeal, attempts to raise an issue not brought
below.

At the final hearing held October 1, 1990, Salazar's

attorney did not mention the filing of chapter 13 as tolling the
ten day appeal period.
timely notice was made.

In the Salazar brief some claim for lack of
However, Salazar's failure to bring the

matter forward on October 1, 1990, or by a subsequent motion to
reconsider effectively waived this claim.
Salt Lake County v. Carlston. 776 P.2d 653 (Utah App. 1989),
is a recent decision supporting Ford's claim that Salazar waived
-3-

the tolling argument.

In that case Defendant was appealing a lower

court decision based upon an adverse jury verdict.

Although she

failed to object to the method of jury selection at trial, she
raised for the first time certain constitutional issues in
conjunction with a motion for new trial, which motion was denied.
The appellate court held that it could not even consider those
issues, due to Defendant's failure to present them in a timely
manner at trial.

In quoting other Utah appellate decisions the

court stated as follows:
It is axiomatic that, before a party may
advance an issue on appeal, the record must clearly
show that it was timely presented to the trial court in
a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon.
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894 n.
2 (Utah 1988). Issues not raised in the trial court in
timely fashion are deemed waived, precluding this court
from considering their merits on appeal.
E.g.,
Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 837
(Utah 1984) (heresay objection raised for the first
time in post-judgment motion is too late to be reviewed
on appeal); Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659
P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983) (issue of contract
amendment untimely where raised in objection to summary
judgment). Id., at 655.
Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198 (Utah App. 1989), was an appeal
by a Plaintiff in a slip and fall case also claiming error by the
trial court in the jury selection process.

This court in a per

curiam decision held that it could not consider such an issue,
since it was not raised below.

In ruling that appellant could not

raise new issues on appeal not properly asserted or reserved below
the court stated that one reason was as followsi

-4-

A timely and recorded objection to the trial
court's failure to comply with a request at trial puts
the judge on notice of the asserted error and allows
the opportunity for correction at that time in the
course of the proceeding. A specific objection to the
failure to make a requested voir dire inquiry is
required so that the trial court may correct its error
before the jury is selected and empaneled. Id., at 201.
Salazar failed to even mention tolling at the hearing.

Nor

did he attempt to remedy this failure by requesting a new hearing
or by filing a motion to reconsider, both of which options were
available.

The appellant court cannot consider the tolling claim.

POINT III.

THE STATURE CLEARLY REQUIRED AN APPEAL WITHIN TEN DAYS

OF THE DATE THE JUDGMENT WAS SIGNED.
Judgment was signed on September 10, 1990.
filed until September 26, 1990.

The appeal was not

Salazar has argued that he had

extra time at both the beginning and at the end of the ten day
period.

The statute supports neither theory.

U.C.A. Section 78-

36-11 (1953) states "Either party may, within ten days, appeal from
the judgment rendered."
In Albretson v. Judd. 709 P.2d 347 (Utah 1985), the Utah
supreme court on its own motion dismissed an appeal as being
untimely.

The plaintiff in a legal malpractice action failed to

file her appeal within one month.

-5-

The court stated as follows:

In order to timely appeal, the plaintiff was
required to file her notice within one month of the
entry of the judgment.
The running of the time for
appeal is only terminated by a timely filed motion to
alter or amend the judgment or for a new trial under
Rules 50(b), 52(b), or 59, Utah R.Civ.P. See Rule
73(b), Utah R.Civ.P.
The judgment from which the
plaintiff appeals was entered November 7, 1983. The
plaintiff's appeal was not filed until June 4, 1984.
No motion to alter or amend the judgment or findings,
or for a new trial was filed or served within the
requisite ten days which would extend the time for
appeal. IcL at 347.
The

failure

to appeal

within

the

statutory

time

was

jurisdictional, and the supreme court could not consider it. The
same is true in the instant case.

Two Arizona decisions dealing

with ten day appeal periods are also helpful.
DNB Const. , Inc. v. Superior Court, Ariz. 607 P. 2d 380, was a
1980 case in which a justice of the peace court's decision was
appealed to a higher trial court.

However, the appeal was not

perfected until after the ten day period as required
statute.

by the

The supreme court of Arizona stated that the only issue

before it was when did the time begin to run for appeal.

The court

held as follows:
The judgment is entered at the time he signs the
docket, A.R.S. Section 22-242, and the aggrieved party
has 10 days in which to perfect his appeal, A.R.S.
Section 22-262. Id,, at 381.
The aggrieved party did not have extra time for mailings.
had ten days.

-6-

He

In Matter of Appeal In Pima Ctv Juvenile Action, 660 P. 2d
1205, (Ariz. 1982), the supreme court of Arizona in a later
decision dealing with the termination of parental rights and the
timeliness of appeal in its dicta stated that the aggrieved party's
attorney has a duty to insure that the time for appealing does not
pass.
[I]t has unequivocally been held that it is the
duty of counsel to insure that matters subject to
prescribed time limits are acted upon within those time
limits. Keifer v. May, 22 Ariz. App. 567, 529 P.2d 721
(1974). To this end counsel has an obligation to check
the court records to determine the exact date of the
entry of a final order so he can preserve his client's
rights to appeal.
Thomas v. Western Savings and Loan
Ass'n, 6 Ariz.App. 511, 433 P.2d 1003 (1967). Id., at
1206.
Salazar admits receiving notice that the judgment was entered
within a reasonable time.
September 21, 1990.

The appeal had to be filed no later than

Since it was not filed until September 26,

1990, the lower court was correct in dismissing the appeal.

-7-

Conclusion
Salazar has failed to prove that the lower court case was
anything but an action based in unlawful detainer, as ruled by
Judge Burton.

He failed to appeal within ten days.

His appeal was

appropriately denied.
Ford should be awarded its costs on appeal.

Respectfully submitted this

day of December, 1991.

HIKEL M. BOLEY
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
BRIEF OF APPELLEE, postage prepaid, this

day of December,

1991, addressed as follows*
WESLEY F. SINE
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS
349 SOUTH 200 EAST, #170
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

MIKEL M. BOLEY
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
P.O. Box 70584
West Valley City, Utah 84170-0584
968-8282 or 968-3501
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ADDENDUM

CHAPTER 36
FORCIBLE ENTRY A N D D E T A I N E R
Section
78-36-1
78-36-2
78 36-3
78 36-4
78-36-5
78 36 6
78 36 7
78 36 8

78-36-8 5
78 36-9
78-36-10

78-36-11
78-36 12

78-36-12 3
78-36-12 6

'Forcible e^ntry" defined
"Forcible detainer defined
Unlawful detainer by tonan + foi ti rm
less than life
Right of tenant of agncultuial lands
to hold over
Remedies available to tenant againsl
undertenant
Notice to quit - How served
Necessary parties defendant
Allegations permitted in complaint —
Time for appearance — Service of
summons
Possession bond of plaintiff — Alter
native remedies
Proof required by plaintiff- Defense
Judgment for restitution damages,
and rent — Immediate enforcement
— Treble damages
Time for appeal
Exclusion of tenant without judicial
process prohibited — Abandoned
premises excepted
Definitions
Abandoned premises — R( taking and
rerenting by owner — LiabihU of
tenant — Personal property of tenant left on premises

78-36-1. "Forcible entry" defined.
Everv person is guilty of a foicible entry, who ei
ther
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other
parts of a house, or by fraud, intimidation or
stealth, or b> any kind of violence or circum
stances of terror, enters upon or into any real
propi rty, or,

\l) after t n t e n n g peuuably upon real pi op
erty turns out by force, threats or menacing con
duct the party m actual possession
ier>3
78-36-2 " F o r c i b l e d e t a i n e r " defined.
Lvcr\ person is guiltv of a forcible detainer who
either
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of vio
lencc unlawfully holds ai d ke< ps the possession
of any real property, whethei the same was ac
quired peaceably or otherwise, or,
(2) in the nighttime, or during the absence of
the occupants of (my real property, unlawfully
enters thereon, and, after demand made for the
surrender thereof, refuses for the period of thiee
days to surrender the same to such former occupant The occupant of real property within the
meaning of this subdivision is one who within
five days preceding such unlawful entry was in
the peaceable and Undisturbed possession of such
lands
IBM
78-36-3.

Unlawful d e t a i n e r by tenant for t e r m
less than life.
( D A tenant of real property, for a term less than
life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer
(a) when he continues in possession, in person
or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it,
after the expiration of the specified term or pe
nod foi which it is let to him which specified
tei m or period whether established by express or
implied contract or whether wntten or parol,
shall be terminated* without notice at the expira
tion of the specified term or period,
<bl when having leased real property for an
indefinite time with monthly oi other periodic
icnt reserved
d) he continues in possession of it in per
M)ii oi by subtenant aftei the end of any
month or period, in cases where the owner,
his designated agent, or any successor in es
tate of the owner, 15 days or more prior to
the end of that month or period has served
notice l e q u i n n g him to quit the premises at
the expuation of that month or period, or
in) in cases of tenancies at will, where he
remains in possession of the premises after
the expiration of a notice of not less than five
days,
tc) when he continues in possession, in person
or by subtenant, after default in the payment of
any rent and after a notice in writing requiring
in the alternative the pavment of the lent or the
surrender of the detained premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of three
days after s e n ice, which notice may be served at
any time after the rent becomes due,
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased
premises contrary to the covenants of the lease,
or commits or permits waste on the premises, or
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful busi
ness on or in the premises, or when he suffers,
permits or maintains on or about the premises
any nuisance, and remains in possession after
service upon him of a three days' notice to quit,
or
(e) when he continues in possession, in person
or by subtenant after a neglect or failure to per
form any condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement under which the property is held,
other than those previously mentioned, and after
notice in writing requiring in the alternative the

performance of the conditions or covenant or tn<?
surrender of the propert> served upon him and
upon anv subtenant in actual occupation of th«
premises remains uncomplied with for thiet day*
after service Within three days after the service
of the notice the tenant, any subtenant in actual
occupation of the premises any mortgagee oftre
term or other peison interested in its contm
uance may perform the condition or covenant and
thereb) save the lease from forfeiture, except
that if the covenants and conditions of the lease
violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be per
formed, then no notice need be given
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a
mobile home is determined under Chapter 16, Title
57, Mobile Home Park Residency Act
»•*
78-36-4

Right of tenant of a g r i c u l t u r a l lands to
hold o v e r .
In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands
where the tenant has held over and retained posses
sion for moie than 60 days after the expiration of his
term without anv demand of possession or notice to
quit by the owner, his designated agent or his succes
sor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by permis
sion of the owner, his designated agent, or his succes
sor in estate, and shall be entitled to hold under the
terms of the lease for another full year and shall not
be gutltv of an unlawful detainer during that vear
and the holding over for the 60 day period ^hall be
taken and construed as a consent on the p n t of the
tenant to hold for another > ear
i# l
78-36-5

R e m e d i e s a v a i l a b l e to t e n a n t against
undei tenant
A tenant may take proceedings similar to tho^e
presmhed in this chapter to obtain possession of the
premises let to an undc rtenant in cast of his u i la* nil
detention of the premises underltt to him
i* 53
78-36-6. Notice to q u i t — H o w s e i v t d
The notices required by the preceding sections may
be served
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant person
ally,
(2> by sending a copy through registered or
certified mail addn Sbed to the tenant at his place
of residence,
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence or
from his usual place of business, by leaving a
copy with a person of suitable age and discretion
at either place and mailing a copy to the tenant
at the address of his place of residence or place of
business, or
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion can
not be found at the place of residence, then by
affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the
leased property Service upon a subtenant may
be made in the same manner
i*87
78-36-7. N e c e s s a r y p a r t i e s defendant.
No person other than the tenant of the premises
and subtenant if there is one in the actual occupation
of the premises when the action is commenced, need
be made a party defendant in the proceeding nor
shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who might
have been made a party defendant, but when it ap
pears that any of the parties served with process or
appearing in the proceedings are guilty judgment
must be rendered against them In case a person has
become subtenant of the premises in controversy af*
ter the service of any notice in this chapter provided

for, the fact t h a t s u c h n o t i c e w a s not s e r v e d on s u c b
subtenant s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e no d e f e n s e to t h e a c t i o n .
All persons w h o e n t e r u n d e r t h e t e n a n t a f t e r t h e commencement of t h e a c t i o n h e r e u n d e r s h a l l be b o u n d by
the j u d g m e n t t h e s a m e a s if t h e y h a d b e e n m a d e p a r ties to t h e a c t i o n .
;
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78-36-8. A l l e g a t i o n s p e r m i t t e d in c o m p l a i n t —
T i m e for a p p e a r a n c e — Service of
summons.
The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting
forth the facts on which he seeks to recover, may set
forth any circumstances of fraud, force, or violence
which may have accompanied the alleged forcible
entry, or forcible or unlawful I detainer, and claim
damages therefor or compensation for the occupation
of the premises, or both. If the unlawful detainer
charged is afler default in the payment of rent, the
complaint shall state the amount of rent due. The
,ourt shall indorse on the summons the number of
days within which the defendant is required to appear and defend the action, which shall not be less
than three or more than 20 days from the date of
service. The court may authorize service by publication or mail for cause shown. Service by publication is
complete one week ailer publication. Service by mail
is complete three days after mailing. The summons
shall be changed in form to conform to the time of
service as ordered, and shall be served as in other
cases.
»»H7
78-36-8.5.

P o s s e s s i o n b o n d of plaintiff — Alternative remedies.
(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint
and the entry of final judgment, the plaintiff may
execute and file a possession band. The bond may be
in the form*of a corporate bond, a c&sh bond, certified
funds, or a property bond executed by two persons
who own real property in the state and who are not
parties to the action. The court shall approve the
bond in an amount that is the probable amount of
costs of suit and damages which may result to the
defendant if the suit has been improperly instituted.
The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court for
the benefit of the defendant for all costs and damages
actually adjudged against the plaintiff. The plaintiff
shall notify the defendant that he has filed a possession bond. This notice shall be served in the same
manner as service of summons and shall inform the
defendant of all of the alternative remedies and procedures under Subsection (2).
(2) The following are alternative remedies and procedures applicable to an action if the plaintifT files a
possession bond under Subsection (1):
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer action based solely upon nonpayment of rent or
utilities, the existing contract shall remain in
force and the complaint shall be dismissed if the
defendant, within three days of the service of the
notice of the possession bond, pays accrued rent,
utility charges, any late fee, and other costs, including attorney's [evs, as provided in the rental
agreement.
tb> The defendant may remain in possession if
he executes and files a counter bond in the form
of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds,
or a property bond executed by two persons who
own real property in the state and who are not
parties to the action. The form of the bond is at
the defendant's option. The bond shall be payable
to the clerk of the court. The defendant shall file
the bond prior to the expiration of three days

from the date he is served with notice of lh»* 111
ing of plaintiffs possession bond. The court shall
approve the bond in an amount that is the probable amount of costs of suit and actual damages
that may result to the plaintiff if the defendant
has improperly withheld possession. The court
shall consider prepaid rent to (he owner as a ;MI
tion of the defendant's total bond
(c) The defendant, upon demand, shall be
granted a hearing to be held prior to the expiration of three days from the date the defendant is
served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession bond.
(3) If the defendant does not elect and comply with
a remedy under Subsection <2) within the required
time, the plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, shall bt
granted an order of restitution The constable of the
precinct or the sheriff of the county where the [nop
erty is situated shall return possession of the pi -p
erty to the plaintiff promptly.
(4) If the defendant demands a hearing uiidei Sub
section (2)(c), and if the court rules after the lu-annj.'
that the plaintifT is entitled to possession of the pi op
erty. the constable or sheriff shall promptly reiuin
possession of the property to the plaintiff. If ,u tluhearing the court allows the defendant to remain in
possession and further issues remain to be ad rah
cated between the parties, the court shall require th.
defendant to post a bond as required in Subset ti *rj
(2Kb). If at the hearing the court rules thai all isue>
between the parties can be adjudicated without fur
ther court proceedings, the court shall, upon adjudi
eating those issues, enter judgment on the merits
78-36-9. P r o o f r e q u i r e d by plaintiff — Defense.
On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry
or forcible detainer the plaintifT shall only be required to show, in addition to the forcible entry oi
forcible detainer complained of, that he was peace
ably in the actual possession at the time of the forcible entry, or was entitled to the. possession at the
time of the forcible detainer. The defendant may
show in his defense that he or his ancestors, or those
whose interest in such premises he claims, had been
in the quiet possession thereof for the space of one
whole year continuously next before the commence
ment of the proceedings, and that his interest therein
is not then ended or determined; and such showing is
a bar to the proceedings.
i9.r>:i
78-36-10.

J u d g m e n t for r e s t i t u t i o n , d a m a g e s ,
and rent — Immediate enforcement Treble damages.
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or
upon default. A judgment entered in favor- of the
plaintifT shall include an order for the restitution of
the premises. If the proceeding is for unlawful de
tainer after neglect or failure to perform an> roiuh
tion or covenant of the lease or agreement under
which the property is held, or after default in the
payment of renl, the judgment shall also dec hoc the
forfeiture of the lease or agreement
(21 The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tn. <j
without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall
also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff
from any of the following
(a» forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c> waste of the premises during the defen
dant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in the com
plaint and proved at trial; and

(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after default in the payment of
rent.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for t\iO. rent, for three times the amount of the
damages assessed under Subsectii.ns (2)(a) through
(2)(c), and for reasonable attorney's tees, if they are
provided for in the lease or agreement.
(4) If the proceeding it* for unlawful detainer after
default in the payment of the rent, execution upon
the judgment shall be issued immediately after the
entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may
be issued and enforced immediately
HW7
78-36-11. T i m e for a p p e a l .
Either party may, within ten days, appeal from the
judgment rendered.
i»53
E x c l u s i o n of t e n a n t w i t h o u t j u d i c i a l
process prohibited — Abandoned
premises excepted.
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a
tenant from the tenant's premises in any manner except by judicial process, provided, an owner or his
agent shall not be prevented from removing the contents of the leased premises under Subsection
78-36-12.6(2) and retaking the premises and attempting to rent them at a fair rental value when the fenant has abandoned the premises.
I»HI

tion (aI nolwiifisiaruiing ui.is. m r «,»..<
re-rent the premises
(2) If the tenant has abandoned the prein -es
has left personal property on the premises tiI• • <••
is entitled to remove the property Iron, the d.« elstore tt for the tenant, and recover actual mo\ mir
storage costs from the tenant. The owner j-h ill v
reasonable efforts to not if;, the tenant of the Ic •
of the personal pioperty; however, if the propeit;,
been in storage for cn'er 30 days and the ien:i t
made no reasonable effort to recover it 'he n-may sell the property and apply the proceeds {•>«.
any amount the tenant owes Any monev leji .
from the sale of the property shall be handled us <:
ified in Section 78-4 4 I ft Nothing contained in
act shall be in derogation of or alter the ov\
rights under Chapter 3. Title 38.

78-36-12.

78-36-12.3. Definitions.
(1) "Willful exclusion'- means preventing the tenant from entering into ihe premises with intent to
deprive the tenant of such entry.
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the premises and shall also have the same meaning as landlord under common law and the statutes of this state.
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the following situations:
la) The tenant has not notified the owner that
he or she will he absent from the premises, and
the tenant fails to pay rex\\ within 15 days after
the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence
other than the presence of the tenant's personal
property that the tenant is occupying the premises; or
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that
he or she will he absent from the premises, and
the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the
tenant's personal property has been removed
from the dwelling unit and there is no reasonable
evidence that the tenant is occupying the premises.
1981
78-36-12.6. A b a n d o n e d p r e m i s e s — R e t a k i n g
a n d r e r e n t i n g by o w n e r — Liability of
t e n a n t — P e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y of t e n a n t
left on p r e m i s e s .
(1) In the event of abandonment the owner may
retake the premises and attempt to rent them at a
fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the
premises shall be liable:
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of
the term; or
(b) for rent accrued during the period necessary to re-rent the premises at a fair rental
value, plus the difference between the fair rental
value and the rent agreed to in the prior rental
agreement, plus a reasonable commission for the
renting of the premises and the costs, if any, necessary to restore the rental unit to its condition
when rented by the tenant less normal wear and
tear. This subsection applies, if less than Subsec-
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78-37-1.

F o r m of a c t i o n — J u d g m e n t — S P execution.
There can be one action for the recovery of any <'
or the enforcement of any right secured ^oleiy
mortgage upon real estate which action m o t h
accordance with the provisions of this chapter '>
ment shall be given adjudging the amount d-a- *
costs and disbursements, and the sale of mnrtg««..
property, or some part thereof, to satisfy said anu»i
and accruing costs, and directing the sherd! to ,
aed and sell the same according to the provh ion.law relating to sales on execution, and a special c
cution or order of sale shall he issued for that \
pose.
78-37-2. Deficiency j u d g m e n t — E x e c u t i o n .
If it appears from the return of the officer innL
the sale that the proceeds are insufficient and a h
ance still remains due, judgment therefor must tl
be docketed by the clerk and execution may he iss i
for such balance as in other cases; but no genr
execution shall issue until after the sale of the nv :
gaged property and the application of the amouni
alized as aforesaid.
i
78-37-3.

N e c e s s a r y p a r t i e s — U n r e c o r d e d rig^
barred.
No person holding a conveyance from or under t
mortgagor of the property mortgaged, or havin?
lien thereon, which conveyance or lien does not
pear of record in the proper office at the time of v
commencement of the action, need be made o party
such action, and the judgment therein rendered, a
the proceedings therein had, are as conclusi
against the party holding such unrecorded conve

